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Chulin 79

CHULIN 79 (20 Nisan) - Today's Daf has been sponsored by Martin Fogel of Carlsbad, California in memory of his father, Yaakov ben Shlomo Fogel, on the day of his Yahrzeit.


(a) What do we comment when Shmuel rules like Chananya?

(b) We are referring to his statement with regard to a Mishnah in Kilayim.
What does Rebbi Yehudah say there regarding breeding a mule whose mother is a horse ...

  1. ... but whose father is a donkey with an animal similar to itself?
  2. ... with one whose mother is a donkey? Why the difference?
(c) What did Shmuel comment on this Mishnah? Who is 'the Chachamim' that he quotes?

(d) What does this prove?

(a) We ask whether Rebbi Yehudah actually holds 'Ein Chosheshin le'Zera ha'Av' or whether it is only a Safek by him. What are the ramifications of the She'eilah?

(b) We try to resolve the She'eilah from the Beraisa where Rebbi Yehudah says 'Kol ha'Noladin min ha'Sus, Af-al-Pi she'Avihen Chamor, Mutarin Zeh ba'Zeh'.
What makes us think that he must be speaking about regular horses with babies from mules whose fathers are donkeys (even though the Lashon does not imply that), a proof that he holds for sure 'Ein Chosheshin le'Zera ha'Av'?

(c) What do we then answer? If all the animals are born from horses whose fathers are donkeys, and Rebbi Yehudah holds 'Ein Chosheshin le'Zera ha'Av', what is he indeed coming to teach us?

(d) How will Rebbi Yehudah explain why, if 'Chosheshin le'Zera ha'Av', it is then permitted?

(a) In another Beraisa, what does Rebbi Yehudah say about a she-mule that wants to mate, assuming that one has the choice of a horse, a donkey and a mule to offer it?

(b) What do we try to prove from there?

(c) If, as we answer, the owner does not know whether the mule was born from a horse or from a donkey, then what does Rebbi Yehudah mean when he says 'Ela Miynah'?

(d) How can it be that the owner does not know the species of the mule's father, when there are clear Simanim regarding its voice, the ears and the tail, as we are now about to explain?

(a) What distinction does ...
  1. ... Abaye draw between the voice of a mule whose father is a donkey and one whose father is a horse?
  2. ... Rav Papa draw between the length of the ears and tail of a mule whose father is a donkey and one whose father is a horse?
(b) What is the significance of 'Tzanif Kaleih', the Lashon used by Abaye to describe the voice of a horse?

(c) We resolve our She'eilah from a statement by Rav Huna b'rei de'Rav Yehoshua.
What did he say that does that?

(a) What instructions did Rebbi Aba issue to his servant, when the latter went to look for mules to hitch on to his (Rebbi Aba's) wagon?

(b) What must Rebbi Aba therefore hold?

(c) How do we also prove from there that Simanim are d'Oraysa?

(d) Why would there be no problem in circumventing the Isur of Geneivah (by giving back a lost article to someone who may not be the owner, by means of Simanim)?

Answers to questions



(a) The Tana Kama in a Beraisa incorporates both Kil'ayim and a Coy in the Isur of 'Oso ve'es B'no'.
What is the difference between Kil'ayim and a Coy?

(b) Why might we have thought that a Coy is different than Kil'ayim in this regard?

(c) What does Rebbi Eliezer say?

(a) How does Rav Chisda establish the Machlokes between Rebbi Eliezer and the Rabbanan

(b) What is the significance of Rav Chisda's statement? How do others define a Coy?

(c) Why can Rav Chisda not be referring to Shechting the baby born to ...

  1. ... a deer but whose father is a goat, on the same day as its mother?
    What did Rav Chisda himself say about such a case?
  2. ... a goat but whose father is a deer, on the same day as its mother?
    What did Rav Chisda himself say there?
(a) We re-establish the case with regard to Shechting the female child of a deer, but whose father is a goat.
What exactly, is the case?

(b) Which two points then form the basis of the Rabbanan's opinion?

(c) But how can one be Chayav, when the child is a complete Chayah (and not one of the Beheimos listed in the Torah)?

(d) With which point does Rebbi Eliezer argue?

(a) Seeing as their basic Machlokes is whether we say 'Chosheshin le'Zera ha'Av' or not, why do Rebbi Eliezer and the Rabbanan not argue over whether 'Oso ve'es B'no' applies to the father or not (like Chananya and the Rabbanan)?

(b) Why does the Mishnah in 'Kisuy ha'Dam' forbid the Shechitah of a Coy on Yom-Tov?

(c) What does the Tana rule in a case where one nevertheless Shechted it?

(d) What problem do we have with establishing the Mishnah by a Coy whose mother is a ...

  1. ... deer, but whose father is a goat?
  2. ... goat, but whose father is a deer?
(a) So we establish it like the latter case (by a Coy whose mother is a goat, but whose father is a deer).
Then why, according to the Rabbanan, can one not Shecht it on Yom-Tov and cover the blood (like we just asked)?

(b) If that is what the Rabbanan hold (in connection with their Machlokes with Rebbi Eliezer regarding 'Oso ve'es B'no'), what do we initially assume, must Rebbi Eliezer hold?

(a) The same Tana'im also argue in a Beraisa, over the Mitzvah of Matanos (i.e. Zero'a, Lechayayim and Keivah). Both agree that an animal of Kil'ayim is subject to Matanos.
What do they say with regard to the Matanos of a Coy?

(b) Why, if we establish the Beraisa by a Coy whose mother is a deer but whose father is a goat, is there no problem, if the author is Rebbi Eliezer?

(c) We do however, have a problem, if the author is the Rabbanan.
What must they mean when they rule that a Coy is subject to Matanos?

(d) Why is there a problem even with the half that is Chayav?

(a) So how do we establish the Beraisa?

(b) Why is there then no problem according to the Rabbanan?

(c) What, on the other hand, is now the problem with Rebbi Eliezer?

(d) So we conclude that Rebbi Eliezer, like the Rabbanan, holds 'Ein Chosheshin le'Zera ha'Av', but only mi'Safek.
Then what is the basis of their Machlokes with regard to 'Oso ve'es B'no' (where the Rabbanan say 'Noheg bi'K'vi', and Rebbi Eliezer, 'Eino Noheg')?

(a) Consequently, Kisuy ha'Dam and Matanos both speak in the case of a Coy whose mother is a goat but whose father is a deer, and their Machlokes in both cases is whether we say "Seh", 'va'Afilu Miktzas Seh' (the Rabbanan) or not (Rebbi Eliezer), like we just explained. Regarding 'Oso ve'es B'no', we conclude, they argue in both possible scenarios.
What are they are arguing over in the case of a Coy whose mother is ...
  1. ... a deer, and his father, a goat?
  2. ... a goat, and his father, a deer?
(b) Why, in the former case, according to ...
  1. ... the Rabbanan, does one not receive Malkos?
  2. ... Rebbi Eliezer, may one even Shecht the two animals Lechatchilah? Why is there no Isur?
(c) Why is the latter case ...
  1. ... subject to Malkos according to the Rabbanan?
  2. ... not subject to Malkos, according to Rebbi Eliezer?
(d) Based on what principle does one not therefore receive Malkos?
Answers to questions

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